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Abstract: Smartphones contain a trove of sensitive per-
sonal data including our location, who we talk to, our
habits, and our interests. Smartphone users trade ac-
cess to this data by permitting apps to use it, and in
return obtain functionality provided by the apps. In
many cases, however, users fail to appreciate the scale
or sensitivity of the data that they share with third-
parties when they use apps. To this end, prior work has
looked at the threat to privacy posed by apps and the
third-party libraries that they embed. Prior work, how-
ever, fails to paint a realistic picture of the full threat
to smartphone users, as it has typically examined apps
and third-party libraries in isolation.
In this paper, we describe a novel and potentially
devastating privilege escalation attack that can be per-
formed by third-party libraries. This attack, which we
call intra-library collusion, occurs when a single library
embedded in more than one app on a device leverages
the combined set of permissions available to it to pil-
fer sensitive user data. The possibility for intra-library
collusion exists because libraries obtain the same privi-
leges as their host app and popular libraries will likely
be used by more than one app on a device.
Using a real-world dataset of over 30,000 smart-
phones, we find that many popular third-party libraries
have the potential to aggregate significant sensitive
data from devices by using intra-library collusion. We
demonstrate that several popular libraries already col-
lect enough data to facilitate this attack. Using histori-
cal data, we show that risks from intra-library collusion
have increased significantly over the last two-and-a-half
years. We conclude with recommendations for mitigat-
ing the aforementioned problems.
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1 Introduction
The average smartphone has more than 25 apps in-
stalled [25], each having varying access to the device
depending on the permissions that have been granted
to them. These permissions are shared by third-party
libraries (henceforth called libraries, for brevity), which
are embedded within apps and enjoy the privileges
granted to the host apps. Libraries are used extensively
across the app ecosystem. App developers use them to
monetize apps, integrate with social media, or simply to
provide complex app functionality with little program-
ming effort required. While libraries provide unquestion-
able benefit to app developers and the app ecosystem as
a whole, prior work has shown that they also contribute
negative effects to user privacy [7, 20, 29, 32]. For ex-
ample, libraries may track users, abuse the permissions
they have been granted, or leak sensitive personal data.
The Android security model does not support the
separation of privileges between apps and their embed-
ded libraries. As such, not only do libraries inherit the
permissions granted to their host apps, the developers
of the host apps themselves are sometimes forced to
declare additional permissions to support embedded
libraries [26, 30]. Additional permissions may espe-
cially benefit advertising libraries (henceforth called
ad libraries) as they facilitate behavioural advertising
through greater potential for user profiling. Ur et al. [36]
found that users were generally unaware of the inner
workings of behavioural advertising, and described the
practice as “scary” and “creepy”. Along similar lines,
Spensky et al. [31] argue that users cannot be expected
to fully understand the implications of sharing their
personal data.
The current Android security model facilitates the
following threats from libraries:
– Libraries may abuse the privileges granted to host
apps.
– Libraries may track users without their consent.
– Opportunistic libraries may aggregate multiple sig-
nals for detailed user profiling.
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Device
App A
Permissions granted to app:
A,B,D
Library permission usage:
library-1: A
library-2: A,B,C,F
library-3: B
App B
Permissions granted to app:
A,C,E
Library permission usage:
library-0: C
library-2: A,B,C,F
library-3: B
App C
Permissions granted to app:
F
Library permission usage:
library-1: A
library-2: A,B,C,F
library-4: E
Fig. 1. An example of how intra-library collusion (ILC) could happen in practice. Libraries are able to use permissions in blue because
they have been granted to the app, while permissions in red are unavailable for libraries within that app. Overall, library-2 is able to
access a total of four permissions on the device.
Recently, Bosu et al. [9] studied the possibility of more
than one apps colluding to leak sensitive data using
inter-component communication (ICC). Prior studies
have also examined privacy leaks using ICC [11, 18, 19,
23], but real-world attacks are limited since they require
one1 or more malicious apps to be installed on devices
to facilitate the attack.
On the other hand, a novel privilege escalation at-
tack we call intra-library collusion (ILC) is much more
likely. ILC is the phenomenon that happens when in-
dividual libraries obtain greater combined privileges on
a device by virtue of being embedded within multiple
apps, with each app having a distinct set of permissions
granted. The “collusion” between instances of the same
library need not happen on the device. Indeed, the li-
brary can transmit individual streams of sensitive user
data to a remote server where it can be aggregated to
better profile the unaware user. Prior work [32] has only
looked at the possibility of tracking users across apps,
whereas ILC concerns aggregating sensitive user data
across apps.
ILC is visually depicted in Fig. 1. From the figure,
library-2 is shared across all apps, and has combined
access to four permissions (A,B,C,F), although in any
single app it has access to a maximum of two permis-
sions (A,B or A,C). Thus, library-2 may benefit from
ILC. Note that libraries may also further their malfea-
sance by leveraging sources of data not guarded by per-
missions, such as the list of apps installed on a device.
1 One malicious app is sufficient for a confused deputy at-
tack [10] if a benign, but vulnerable, app is present on the device.
Such data has previously been shown to be useful for
predicting user traits [28].
Concretely, ILC is possible if the following condi-
tions are true:
1. Two or more installed apps, A1, ..., An, contain the
same library L.
2. Apps A1, ..., An have sets of permissions granted to
them such that the union of the sets of permissions
U contains more permissions than any of the indi-
vidual sets of permissions.
3. L contains code that allows it to make API calls
that are guarded by two or more permissions in U .
4. L has the ability to uniquely identify a device.
5. L transmits sensitive data to its server.
Privilege escalation using ILC is a greater problem than
privilege escalation through ICC, since libraries are de-
signed to be embedded within multiple apps by defini-
tion. This increases the likelihood that any given device
will contain two or more apps with the same library
embedded. Moreover, the existence of very popular li-
braries with total install-bases in the billions suggests
that potential for ILC should be very common in prac-
tice. To make matters worse, libraries may have legiti-
mate claims as to why personal data needs to be leaked
from a device, but any aggregation of this data once
it gets to library servers will be opaque to users and
industry regulators alike.
Risks coming from traditional libraries are not the
only worry. Chen et al. [12] argue that libraries are al-
ready being repackaged for propagating malicious code.
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Using their methodology, the authors found that 6.84%
of apps obtained from the Google Play Store were in-
fected with potentially harmful libraries. Potentially
harmful behaviour was also seen in the iOS versions of
libraries. These observations demonstrate that attack-
ers have turned their attention to libraries as a means
of malware propagation, further motivating the need to
study ILC and its effects.
Measuring the potential for ILC requires knowledge
of the lists of apps installed on real-world devices. To
obtain lists of installed apps on real-world devices, we
interfaced with the Device Analyzer project [38]. The
Device Analyzer project is concerned with obtaining us-
age data and other metadata from smartphones, includ-
ing lists of installed apps on devices. From the Device
Analyzer dataset, we were able to obtain the lists of
apps installed on over 30,000 real-world devices to facil-
itate our study. In contrast to prior work, we measure
real-world privacy risks by leveraging the additional in-
sight obtained from access to full lists of apps that are
installed on devices.
In this work, we focus on Android due to the avail-
ability of data on lists of apps installed on Android
devices. However, due to similarities in access control
and app deployment on iOS, we believe many of our
insights may hold on that platform as well.
Contributions. Our paper makes the following contri-
butions to the state-of-the-art:
– We describe a novel privilege escalation attack
called intra-library collusion (ILC), which comes
from libraries embedded within apps.
– We perform the first study on the extent to which
libraries may abuse ILC for better user profiling in
the real-world (Section 4).
– We use a historical dataset of apps to demon-
strate that the potential for ILC (and its conse-
quences) have increased over the last two-and-a-half
years (Section 5).
– We make a first effort to systematically measure
the frequency of transmission of personal data from
real-world devices by advertisement libraries (Sec-
tion 6).
– To justify one of our experimental assumptions,
we measure the adoption of run-time permissions
across popular apps in the Google Play Store (Sec-
tion 3.4.1).
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organised as fol-
lows: Section 2 gives background on important Android-
related concepts; Section 3 describes the methodology
that was used for data collection and analysis; Section 4
presents our measurements of the potential for ILC; Sec-
tion 5 shows how the potential for ILC has increased
over time; Section 6 studies how often and to how many
different destinations sensitive data is leaked; Section 7
discusses the results of our study; Section 8 overviews
related work, including mitigation strategies; and finally
Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 Background
We frame the problem of ILC by first describing the
Android permission model, explaining how libraries fit
into the ecosystem, and explaining our threat model.
2.1 Android Permissions Model
The Android operating system (OS) mediates access to
sensitive device resources using a permission-based ac-
cess control system. Permissions are divided into nor-
mal and dangerous permissions, with normal permis-
sions protecting resources that have very little risk to
user privacy and dangerous permissions guarding access
to private user information and data [2]. Apps wanting
access to sensitive resources guarded by dangerous per-
missions must request the relevant permission and have
it granted by the user. Throughout this paper, we focus
exclusively on dangerous permissions. For this reason,
we hereafter refer to dangerous permissions as permis-
sions.
Apps list the permissions they would like to use in
a manifest file that is bundled within the app. Prior to
Android 6.0, the permissions listed by an app had to
be accepted in full at install-time in an all-or-nothing
manner. As of Android 6.0, permissions must still be
listed in their entirety in the app’s manifest, but they
may be accepted or rejected selectively by users at run-
time. In order for run-time permissions to be triggered,
however, the app itself must have a targetSDK of 23 or
higher.
Android apps are packaged as apk files, which are
compressed archives containing all the resources re-
quired by the app. This means that any libraries lever-
aged by an app are compiled into the same app binary
for distribution. The Android OS does not provide a
facility for privilege separation between apps and their
embedded libraries and thus libraries inherit all permis-
Intra-Library Collusion: A Potential Privacy Nightmare on Smartphones 4
sions granted to apps. Conversely, many libraries use
permissions that are not required by the app that em-
beds them, but due to the lack of privilege separation,
apps also gain additional privileges. This is one expla-
nation as to why many functionally-similar apps ask for
greatly differing permissions [34]. The larger problem
of privilege separation between apps and their libraries
have been explored by several authors [26, 29, 30].
2.2 Embedded Libraries
The problem of the lack of privilege separation in apps
benefits libraries in general and ad libraries in partic-
ular. Ad libraries are provided by ad networks, which
serve as the middle-man connecting advertisers to app
developers. Ad libraries provide easy-to-use interfaces
that allow app developers to quickly insert ads into their
existing apps. The ad library does the heavy lifting by
fetching, displaying, and tracking revenue from ads.
We suspect that ad libraries stand to benefit more
from ILC than other libraries because additional “sig-
nals” obtained from greater access to permissions di-
rectly benefit their ability to perform behavioural and
demographic targeting of ads. This has an end result of
them being better able to provide targeted ads, which
increases click-through rates and consequently generates
increased profits. This is one explanation for the obser-
vations in prior work [20, 32], where ad libraries check
for and use undocumented permissions, i.e., permissions
that have not been described in their SDK documenta-
tion. Other libraries may also benefit from added access
to permissions, as any data they collect can be aggre-
gated and sold to third-parties.
Since libraries may be installed in a variety of apps
with varying permissions, they typically contain code
that checks whether the relevant permissions have been
properly granted before making a permission-protected
API call [20, 32]. Indeed, Fang et al. [15] observed that
libraries were better designed than apps on a whole as
it relates to handling cases where permissions have been
revoked or not granted.
In ad libraries, the use of any permissions should
be carefully scrutinised, since the sole purpose of the
ad library is to serve ads. That is, the ad library it-
self provides no other functionality on a device be-
yond serving ads, and thus any permissions used by
an ad library should be assumed to facilitate bet-
ter ad delivery. Better ad delivery may encompass
better user profiling or the efficient display of ads.
Some permissions, such as READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE and
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE, may be useful for the caching
of ads, which improves user experience. Other permis-
sion usage (such as that observed in [20]), including
reading a user’s calendar, contact lists and call logs sug-
gests highly invasive data collection. Moreover, the guile
of some companies has been demonstrated by their use
of the RECORD_AUDIO permission to enable cross-device
tracking using inaudible ultrasound [24].
Some libraries employ code obfuscation to frustrate
reverse-engineering. This may be to make it difficult to
commit ad fraud or disable ad functionality, but may
also be used to hide unsavoury data collection prac-
tices. Moreover, many libraries also employ dynamic
code loading whereby executable code is retrieved from
the Internet and loaded by the library dynamically, thus
defeating scalable static analysis [29]. The existence of
dynamic programming techniques and obfuscation allow
library developers to execute questionable code on de-
vices while reducing the likelihood of being discovered.
Already, potentially harmful code has been observed in
libraries, affecting hundreds of thousands of apps across
the smartphone ecosystem [12, 29].
2.3 Threat Model
Our main adversaries are the ad networks that provide
ad libraries, since they stand to benefit the most from
invasive data collection. Invasive data collection is ben-
eficial to both the advertiser and app developer (in the
form of revenue), but the end-user suffers from an ero-
sion in their privacy, and the fact that one or more
third-parties are able to construct substantial profiles
of their habits and interests. Other third-parties dis-
tributing libraries (that do not deliver ads) also stand
to benefit if they can capture user data, since this data
can be later sold. These other third-parties include ma-
licious actors that attempt to introduce harmful code in
libraries through repackaging, as observed in [12].
We assume that our adversaries try to collect per-
sonal data, whether overtly or covertly, in order to fa-
cilitate their business objective. For ad networks, this
business objective would be better user profiling for the
purposes of targeting ads. For other non-advertising ad-
versaries, this would be for collecting user data to sell
or trade. Thus, in examining ILC, it is important to
not focus solely on ad libraries. Additionally, it is im-
portant to understand that all streams of personal data
may be valuable, as even innocuous pieces of data when
combined may lead to greater privacy erosion through
inferencing.
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2.3.1 What Personal Data is of Interest
There are several streams of data on a smartphone that
are of interest to adversaries. In what follows, we high-
light what we suspect are the most important ones.
Location. Most modern smartphones contain GPS
hardware, which can precisely pinpoint a user’s loca-
tion. A coarse estimate of a user’s location can also
be obtained from other sources such as nearby Wi-Fi
networks and cell towers. Invasive libraries can track
user movements to determine where they live, work
and socialise based on their location at various times
of the week. Given movement patterns in the evenings,
an adversary could infer that a user is an alcoholic.
This information may be valuable to the user’s insur-
ance company, which itself may be inferred if the user
has the insurance company app installed. Worryingly,
the user’s insurance app can even do this profiling itself.
App Usage. The list of apps installed on a device
may be useful for understanding the interests of a user.
Moreover, information about app usage can reveal the
level of importance of each of these interests to the
user. If app usage data is combined with location data,
a broader picture may be painted of a user. For ex-
ample, a user currently running a stopwatch app does
not say much by itself, but when combined with coarse
location data, an advertiser can determine a victim is
likely training in the gym, as opposed to attending a
social event, at a sports facility. This user may then be
profiled and targeted with advertisements for protein
powder, or more maliciously, anabolic steroids.
Device Information. Smartphones reveal device in-
formation such as device type and model. An adversary
can use this to determine the amount of disposable
income that a user has. Devices also contain unique
identifier information such as an IMEI or SIM card in-
formation. An adversary tracking a user across devices
(using SIM card information and assuming the user
keeps their phone number) can be more confident in
the disposable income of a user, if they are seen to use
only high-end devices over time. Additionally, the IMEI
of a device is also useful for tracking a user across apps,
even if their device is restored to factory state.
Communication. Various communication data can be
used to profile a user. From call logs and messages, an
adversary can determine a user’s close friends. With
sentiment analysis, they may also be able to determine
which contact is the user’s spouse. Analysing text mes-
sages can also help to uncover a user’s interests. The
volume, duration, and time of phone calls can paint a
picture of whether a user is very social and/or outgoing.
Furthermore, parsing a victim’s address book can allow
the adversary to target persons with similar interests to
the victim. Contacts in a user’s address book may also
prove useful if the user is blackmailed. For example, an
attacker may threaten to notify a spouse of the victim’s
use of a dating app.
Storage. The files stored on a device may reveal other
interests of a user. A user with more documents than
pictures may be targeted with productivity tools in-
stead of a digital camera. Conversely, a user with many
pictures whose device is almost out of space may be
targeted with ads for a new smartphone or memory
cards. Further still, recently taken pictures combined
with a user’s location may suggest that the user enjoys
photographing nature.
Microphone. The guile of adversaries has been demon-
strated especially with the abuse of access to the device
microphone. It is no longer necessary for an adversary
to eavesdrop on a victim’s conversations (although they
may still do). Indeed, apps have been known to track
users across devices using ultrasound [24].
3 Methodology
To measure the danger of ILC in the real-world, we
took the following steps:
1. Obtain all apps in the Google Play Store with more
than one million downloads (Section 3.1).
2. Identify the permissions that libraries within these
apps are able to use (Section 3.2).
3. Use app lists from real-world devices to understand
the number of libraries used within apps on devices
and the permissions that they have access to (Sec-
tion 3.3).
3.1 Obtaining Apps for Analysis
In this study, we only considered apps available in the of-
ficial Android app marketplace: the Google Play Store.
Performing our analysis on this universe of apps, i.e.,
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the entire Google Play Store, would require substantial
storage and processing resources. For this reason, we in-
stead opted to analyse popular apps. An app was con-
sidered to be popular if it had more than one million
downloads. By analysing popular apps, we capture a
large cross-section of those apps that would likely be in-
stalled on the average smartphone. This allows us to get
a good indication of the threats to a majority of users,
while limiting the amount of computing resources re-
quired for analysis. While additional information is lost
by not considering less popular apps, these apps have a
much smaller install-base and thus their contribution to
ILC, if present, is already more limited.
To this end, we used a database of Google Play Store
app metadata provided by the authors of [35] to iden-
tify and download all apps with more than one million
downloads. This was 15,052 apps in total.
3.2 Library Permission Usage
Merely looking at the permissions recommended by li-
brary SDK documentation does not provide a complete
understanding of permission usage within libraries. In-
deed, libraries may use more permissions internally, and
the app itself also needs to declare particular permis-
sions (and have them granted) in order for the library
to be able to use them. Conversely, just because an app
declares (and has been granted) particular permissions
does not mean that the library contains code that is
able to leverage these permissions. Thus, several steps
need to be taken to understand what permissions the
libraries within each app have access to. In what fol-
lows, we outline the steps that were taken in this study
to understand the permissions that libraries are able to
use.
1. Decompile the apk file for an app to smali code
using apktool [1].
2. Use a whitelist of library signatures provided by the
authors of FlexDroid [29] to identify library code
as distinct from app code. Libraries could also be
detected using techniques described in [6].
3. Use API-to-permission mappings from PScout [5]
(improvement over Stowaway [16]) to understand
what permissions are required by each API call ob-
served in the smali code. At this point, we know
what set of permissions can be used by library code
and what set can be used by app code.
4. Take the intersection of the permissions declared
in the app’s manifest and the permissions observed
in its smali code to determine what permissions
libraries are actually able to leverage.
Note that this technique may fail to reveal all permis-
sions used if programming features such as dynamic
code loading or reflection are employed. Thus, the per-
missions that are observed are a lower bound on the
actual permissions that may be used in each case. For
this reason, the results we obtain can also be considered
as a lower-bound of the actual privacy risks coming from
apps.
Not all apps were successfully decompiled. Indeed,
a subset of them failed for reasons relating to technical
shortcomings of the decompiler that was used. In the
end, we were able to obtain library permission usage
information for 14,976 apps.
3.3 Obtaining Real-World App Lists
Central to the overall goal of understanding ILC is ob-
taining lists of installed apps on devices, hereafter called
app lists. To obtain app lists, we leveraged the De-
vice Analyzer dataset. Device Analyzer is a project con-
cerned with collecting usage statistics on smartphones.
These usage statistics are collected and uploaded in the
background by the client app, which is voluntarily in-
stalled by contributors to the project. Device Analyzer
has data from over 30,000 contributors.
The most important data that we leverage from De-
vice Analyzer is the app lists from each of the contribut-
ing devices and usage information for each of the apps
in the app lists. Usage information tells when and how
often apps are run by users. Concretely, we leveraged
app lists and app usage information for 30,444 devices.
3.4 Assumptions
During our study we made several assumptions regard-
ing the effect of run-time permissions and the effect of
old Device Analyzer data.
3.4.1 Assumption for Run-time Permissions
The advent of run-time permissions has allowed users
to selectively accept (or reject) permissions individually.
For our study, we assume that apps are granted all per-
missions listed in their manifest as a matter of practical-
ity, since the Device Analyzer dataset that we leverage
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Fig. 2. API levels targeted by apps with more than one million
downloads. Disproportionately more apps target API level 23,
presumably to facilitate run-time permissions.
currently does not capture run-time permissions that
have been granted to apps. This may in turn cause us
to overstate the number of permissions that have been
granted to apps, and consequently, their libraries.
However, for run-time permissions to be triggered, a
device needs to be running at least Android 6.0 and the
app needs to have a targetSDK of 23 or higher. Fig. 2
shows the targetSDK for the apps in our dataset. Ap-
proximately 60% of apps have a targetSDK of 22 or
lower, meaning that our assumption is valid, by default,
in a majority of cases.
Approximately 40% of apps targeted API level 23 or
higher. This means that 40% of the apps in our dataset
will trigger run-time permission requests provided that
they are run on devices with Android 6.0 or higher.
In reality, many devices are running older versions than
Android 6.0, and thus run-time permissions will be trig-
gered in less cases, though this number will increase as
older devices get replaced with newer ones. Additionally,
given user propensity to grant permissions [13, 17], we
suspect that in other cases many run-time permissions
will be granted. This leads to our assumption being valid
in even more cases.
Disproportionately more apps target API level 23 as
shown in Fig. 2. One explanation for this is that these
app developers wanted to take advantage of run-time
permissions and thus targeted this API level to imple-
ment the feature. It remains unclear, however, whether
the developers of the approximately 60% of apps tar-
geting API level 22 or lower have incentive to switch to
run-time permissions.
At this point, we remind the reader that these num-
bers describe the API levels targeted by popular apps.
Popular apps have developers with financial incentives
and resources to update their apps to target the newest
API levels. Thus, we speculate that more than 60% of
unpopular apps will target API levels that pre-date run-
time permissions, i.e., API level 22 or lower.
We used the Google Play Store metadata described
in Section 3.1 to make informed speculation on whether
apps not supporting run-time permissions were likely
to do so in the future. To infer this, we looked at the
update history of apps not supporting run-time permis-
sions. Approximately 64% of apps not supporting run-
time permissions have been updated since Android 6.0
was released (officially on October 5, 2015) and still fail
to support run-time permissions. These apps, on aver-
age, received their latest update 353 days after the re-
lease of Android 6.0. The 36% of apps that have not
been updated since the release of Android 6.0 have an
average update date of 378 days before the release of
Android 6.0. This leads us to believe that many app de-
velopers simply have limited incentive to support run-
time permissions at all. Thus we believe our assumption
regarding run-time permissions is reasonable.
3.4.2 Assumption for Old Device Analyzer Data
Some data in Device Analyzer is old, and the apps used
on devices in those datasets will be older versions than
the versions we have downloaded and statically anal-
ysed. The apps could have since been updated to use
different permissions and libraries. In performing our
analysis, we treat old devices as if they were running
the versions of the apps that we analysed. Given that
apps are set to auto-update by default in the Google
Play Store, we consider it a reasonable assumption that
if the devices still had these apps installed they would
be running the latest versions of said apps. Of course
this is not always the case, but in the worst case what
our assumption does is give an idea of the scale of po-
tential ILC on devices that have the latest versions of
those apps installed.
4 Intra-Library Collusion (ILC)
To make measurements of ILC meaningful, it is first
important to quantify the number of distinct libraries
detected within apps on the devices in our dataset.
Within our dataset, each device had an average of 23.6
detectable libraries within the popular apps that were
installed on those devices.
The Top 18 most popular libraries (i.e., libraries
observed in more than 1% of apps that were studied)
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Table 1. Most popular libraries detected within apps with more
than one million downloads. Note that we omit libraries detected
in less than 1% of apps.
Library % of apps
com/facebook 11.9
com/google/android/gms/analytics 9.8
com/flurry 6.3
com/chartboost/sdk 5.9
com/unity3d 5.2
com/applovin 3.5
com/mopub 3.1
com/inmobi 3.0
com/google/ads 3.0
com/google/android/gcm 2.7
com/tapjoy 2.4
org/cocos2d 2.4
com/amazon 2.0
com/millennialmedia 1.6
org/apache/commons 1.4
com/heyzap 1.4
com/nostra13/universalimageloader 1.3
com/adobe/air 1.0
within apps in our dataset is shown in Table 1. The
most popular libraries included Facebook, Google An-
alytics, Flurry, and Chartboost. Popular ad libraries
such as InMobi, MoPub, Millennial Media, Heyzap
and TapJoy were also seen in the Top 18 most popu-
lar libraries. Several utility libraries were also popular,
providing functionality such as loading/caching images
(com/nostra13/universalimageloader) and rendering
graphics (com/unity3d and org/cocos2d).
4.1 Which Libraries may Benefit from ILC
Fig. 3 shows which libraries are potentially able to bene-
fit from ILC. This was calculated as the number of each
library potentially able to benefit from ILC divided by
the total number of instances where libraries were po-
tentially able to benefit from ILC. In most cases, it was
com/facebook that was potentially able to benefit from
ILC with 31.3%. Other libraries with the potential to
benefit from ILC were com/mopub (21.8%), com/flurry
(14.0%), com/amazon (10.8%), and com/inmobi (8.4%).
Worryingly, the Top 5 libraries that are potentially
able to benefit from ILC include MoPub, Flurry Analyt-
ics and InMobi; known advertising/analytics providers.
Note that this observation is not an indictment against
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Fig. 3. Libraries that are potentially able to benefit from ILC. For
clarity, libraries appearing less than 0.5% of the time are omitted.
any of the libraries mentioned. Rather, it shows the ex-
tent to which ILC could be leveraged in the real-world
by these libraries if they had the desire to do so. Given
the fierce competition between ad libraries, it is con-
ceivable that wily ad networks would exploit ILC by
aggregating user data on their servers, maximising prof-
its while evading detection.
4.2 How Libraries may Benefit from ILC
To fully understand the potential risk to users, we mea-
sured the number of distinct libraries per device that
had the potential to benefit from ILC. These results
are given in Table 2. Approximately two in five devices
(42.4%) are not susceptible to an ILC attack. We note,
however, that a device can go from not being susceptible
to being susceptible through the installation of a single
app. On the other hand, 57.6% of devices had one or
more libraries that are potentially able to benefit from
ILC. In fact, one in five (20.4%) devices in our dataset
had three or more libraries that would be able to bene-
fit from ILC. This is equivalent to approximately 6,000
devices in our dataset, but translated to the real-world
this would amount to hundreds of millions of devices.
At this scale, even a slight improvement in ad targeting
gained by leveraging ILC would reap substantial rev-
enue for ad networks having the requisite guile.
In addition to understanding the number of libraries
able to benefit from ILC, it is also important to quan-
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Table 2. Number of libraries per device that had increased access
to permissions.
Number of Libraries % of devices
0 42.4
1 20.7
2 16.5
3 10.5
4 5.8
5+ 4.1
Table 3. Number of additional permissions a library had access to
beyond the single-app maximum.
Number of Permissions % of cases
1 69.2
2 21.2
3 5.9
4 2.8
5+ 0.9
tify what benefit they would receive by doing so. To
this end, we examined the number of additional per-
missions that a library leveraging ILC would be able to
obtain. This result is given in Table 3. To measure the
increase in permissions, the difference between the to-
tal number of permissions obtained using ILC and the
maximum number of permissions the library could ac-
cess from any one app on the device was taken. In most
cases (69.2%), libraries would be able to access one addi-
tional permission if they leveraged ILC. The number of
devices monotonically decreased as the number of per-
missions increased. Worryingly, libraries would obtain
access to three or more permission on 9.6% of devices
if they leveraged ILC. While 9.6% is not a significant
number of devices, we remind the reader that this would
translate to hundreds of millions of devices in the real-
world.
5 How the Potential for ILC has
Evolved in Two Years
Taylor and Martinovic [35] conducted the first system-
atic large-scale measurement of how permission usage in
apps has increased over time. They also quantified the
extent to which embedded libraries benefited from this
permission increase in a phenomenon they call library
empowerment. Along similar lines, we examine how the
potential for ILC has changed over time as a result of
libraries and apps using more permissions as they are
updated.
To perform this measurement, we used a freely avail-
able dataset [3] of historical versions of apps compiled
using the PlayDrone tool [37]. The historical versions of
apps used were the versions as they were available in
the Google Play Store in October 2014. By measuring
the potential for ILC in these versions of apps as we
did in Section 4, we can see how the potential for ILC
has changed over an approximately two-and-a-half year
period.
Not all 14,976 apps in our current dataset were
available in the historic dataset of apps. This is because
some apps currently in our dataset did not exist in Octo-
ber 2014. Overall, we were able to obtain 11,836 historic
apps. Due to technical shortcomings of the decompilers
used, we were able to obtain library permission usage
information for 11,821 apps. The difference in number
of apps in old and new datasets may skew the results of
our longitudinal study. To prevent such skew, we took
the intersection of the sets of apps that were available
in the old and new datasets. In the end, we were able to
do a longitudinal study of how the potential for ILC at-
tacks on devices changed for 11,774 of apps (with more
than one million downloads) over a two-and-a-half year
period.
Note that increases in the potential for ILC are not
only caused by the apps themselves using more permis-
sions. Indeed, the libraries embedded within apps may
have now been updated to introduce additional code
that makes use of permission-protected APIs. Addition-
ally, wider adoption of particular libraries by app devel-
opers may cause substantial changes in the potential for
ILC, especially if these libraries use many permissions.
5.1 Libraries that May Exploit ILC
Fig. 4 looks at the longitudinal changes in the libraries
that are able to exploit ILC. We use NEW to refer to re-
sults generated from analysing the new versions of apps,
and OLD refers to results obtained by analysing historical
versions of apps. The Facebook library had the largest
increase, going from 2.7% to 31.5%. The Flurry library
had the largest decrease going from 37.9% to 12.9%.
We manually investigated the four libraries that
had the most significant changes over the period
to understand why this was the case. These li-
braries were com/facebook, com/mopub, com/flurry
and com/inmobi. The increase in prevalence for
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Fig. 4. Longitudinal look at changes in the libraries that are able
to benefit from ILC. For clarity, libraries appearing less than 0.5%
of the time are omitted.
com/facebook came about from increased numbers of
apps using the library, as well as the fact that the per-
missions used by the library increased. For com/mopub,
the reason was the same: more apps started using the
library and its permission usage also increased. On the
side of decreases over time, com/flurry and com/inmobi
had their decrease because of less apps using the library.
For both libraries, no change in number of permissions
used was detected. These changes demonstrate the ex-
tent to which the possibility of ILC across devices can
change simply because libraries start using one or more
new permissions and/or because they become more pop-
ular.
5.2 Changes in Potential Benefit from ILC
Table 4 summarises our longitudinal analysis of the
number of libraries per device that were able to ex-
ploit ILC. Worryingly, there was a 19.7% decrease in
the number of libraries per device that were unable to
benefit from ILC. This suggests that library and permis-
sion usage evolution over time is facilitating increases in
the potential to exploit ILC. There was also a 13.8% de-
crease in the case where one library was able to benefit
from ILC. The number of cases where two or more li-
braries per device were able to benefit from ILC went
from 21.5% of cases to 35.5% of cases. Thus, not only is
the potential for ILC increasing, but the consequences
Table 4. Longitudinal look at the number of libraries per device
that had increased access to permissions.
Number of Libraries OLD % NEW % % Change
0 53.8 43.2 -19.7%
1 24.7 21.3 -13.8%
2 12.5 16.4 +31.2%
3 5.6 10.1 +80.4%
4 2.1 5.3 +152.4%
5+ 1.3 3.7 +184.6%
Table 5. Longitudinal look at the number of additional permis-
sions a library had access to beyond the single-app maximum.
Number of Permissions OLD % NEW % % Change
1 86.5% 68.5% -20.8%
2+ 13.5% 31.5% +133.3%
of the attack in terms of number of libraries that can
benefit are increasing as well.
We further analysed the number of additional per-
missions that libraries would be able to exploit if they
leveraged ILC. The results of this analysis is shown in
Table 5. The cases where libraries were able to lever-
age one additional permission fell from 86.5% to 68.5%.
Worryingly, the cases where libraries could access two
or more new permissions, increased from 13.5% of cases
to 31.5% of cases, a 133% increase. Once again, it was
the more dangerous case (increase of 2+ permissions)
that had the greater increase with the less dangerous
case (increase of 1 permission) having a decrease.
6 How Often is Sensitive Data
Sent to Ad Library Servers
We now turn our attention to a case study on ad li-
braries. This is because ad libraries have financial incen-
tive to exploit ILC and from our measurements, several
ad libraries were among the top libraries that were able
to benefit from ILC. Manual decompilation and analy-
sis of the binary JAR files of several ad libraries revealed
that sensitive data such as location data and nearby
Wi-Fi networks are routinely sent with each ad request.
For this reason, we wanted to approximate a lower
bound on how often and to how many different ad
networks such sensitive personal data is sent. This is
useful for understanding the quantity of data that is
exfiltrated from a device to ad networks per day. With
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this estimate, one can obtain a more comprehensive un-
derstanding of the extent to which ad libraries already
collect information suitable for exploiting ILC.
To make the calculations, we needed to understand
how many (and how often) apps were run on devices
per day. This information was obtained by analysing
data on app usage in the Device Analyzer dataset. In
what follows, we discuss some practical assumptions
that were made in performing our calculations.
Leakage of personal data. We assume that each ad
library sends personal data (if relevant permissions are
available) with each ad request. From the sample of ad
libraries that we manually analysed, this assumption is
correct. The literature [20, 32] also agrees that ad li-
braries typically send data useful for profiling with each
ad request. Throughout our calculations, however, we
were careful to deem an ad library as sending sensitive
data with ad requests only if:
1. The ad library contains permission-protected An-
droid API calls.
2. The app embedding the library has declared the rel-
evant permissions that allow the ad library to make
these API calls.
Frequency of leakage. In reality, apps are used mul-
tiple times a day and many of these apps contain ad
libraries which fetch and continuously update ads.
Unfortunately, Device Analyzer data is not granular
enough to say exactly how many times per day and app
is launched or which activity within an app is run. This
fine-grained data (were it available) would enable us
to precisely determine how often ads were shown. This
is because it is possible to determine whether an ad is
embedded within a particular activity of an app. Given
the absence of the requisite fine-grained data, we as-
sume that a single ad is loaded, i.e. sensitive data is sent
once, per ad library per app per day if the app is run
by the user. Anecdotal data suggests that this is a gross
underestimation of what actually happens. However, in
giving this baseline, we obtain an estimate of the lower
bound of sensitive data leakage by ad libraries. Future
researchers with better estimates of how many ads are
served per ad library per app per day will be able to
scale our measurements accordingly.
In making our calculations, we only considered
ad libraries that had a prevalence of more than 1%
across apps in our dataset. Across the Device Analyzer
dataset, devices used an average of 7.4 third-party apps
(available in the Google Play Store) per day. Of these
apps, 4.7 of them were in our app dataset (i.e., they had
one million downloads or more). From these 4.7 apps,
a mean of 2.4 sensitive data leakages were caused by
ad libraries per device per day, using our assumptions.
That is, approximately 50% of apps with over one mil-
lion downloads leak sensitive data per device per day on
average. Further analysis of the data reveals that sensi-
tive data was leaked to approximately 1.7 different ad
servers per device per day.
At the upper end of the spectrum, one device
had 132 instances of sensitive data leakages per day.
Interestingly, at least one device sent data to all the ad
servers that were considered in our measurement. We
discuss these observations further and put them into
context in Section 7.2.
7 Discussion
We have measured the potential for ILC to take place
and the benefits to be gained by libraries exploiting
ILC. We have also shown how the potential for ILC
has increased over a two-and-a-half year period. This
increase is facilitated by apps using more permissions
but also the libraries themselves being updated to use
more permission-protected API calls internally.
Prior work, and our own observations, confirm that
libraries already send enough data back to their servers
to facilitate an ILC attack. This does not mean, how-
ever, that any of the libraries we identified actually en-
gage in this practice. Given the nature of ILC and the
fact that data aggregation happening on the server-side
is opaque, it becomes very difficult to know whether
ILC happens in practice. This problem is further com-
plicated by the fact that libraries may have legitimate
reasons to explain why particular pieces of personal data
need to be transmitted off a device. Once off the device,
however, any aggregation that happens would be invis-
ible.
We suspect that the advertising and analytics indus-
try has the most to gain from exploiting ILC. Given the
guile shown by ad libraries and ad networks in general,
we believe that this may be a very attractive attack,
especially considering that it would be hard to prove
that it was happening. Given the fierce competition in
the advertising and analytics space, any additional sig-
nals about users that can be leveraged from data that
is already being collected can improve an ad network’s
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targeting potential. Even if this improvement is a small
one, when translated to the app ecosystem of millions
of apps and billions of devices, ILC has the potential
to generate (or is already generating) a windfall for ad
networks.
The main catalyst that allows ILC to happen is the
failure of the Android permission system to separate the
privileges of libraries and their host apps. However, even
if this privilege separation were to be implemented in
future Android versions (using strategies such as those
highlighted in Section 8.3), it may be the case as with
run-time permissions (as shown in Section 3.4.1) that
there is limited incentive for app developers to support
it. On the contrary, there may be incentive for app de-
velopers to not support library privilege separation, as
it may impact their profits negatively.
7.1 Addressing the Problem of ILC
In this section, we discuss technical and non-technical
approaches that can be used to mitigate the problem of
ILC.
7.1.1 Technical Approaches
Prior work, such as those highlighted in Section 8.3, at-
tempt to separate privileges and thus alleviate the prob-
lem of ILC somewhat. However, we now use the example
of ad libraries to demonstrate that several concerns will
remain if these strategies are used.
If privileges are removed from libraries altogether,
then ad libraries will have more difficulty in targeting
ads to users. This increases the likelihood that adver-
tisers and ad networks will not be interested in such
systems. Additionally, app developers stand to lose rev-
enue as well and thus may be uninterested in implement-
ing privacy-preserving features. Moreover, depending on
the privilege separation approach used, user data may
be explicitly passed from apps to libraries using data
passing APIs first observed by Book and Wallach [8]
(see Section 8.2) and confirmed by us.
While good for user privacy, less privileged ad li-
braries may actually harm the ecosystem. Much of the
effort that goes into developing apps comes from the
expectation of the app developers that they will receive
a return on their investment when they monetise their
apps. Poor app monetisation could serve as a deterrent
to new app developers entering the market and thus the
end users may ultimately suffer from reduced content.
7.1.2 Non-technical Approaches
Major app stores, such as Google Play, could attempt
to limit ILC by means of modifying their developer poli-
cies. Nation states may also enact and enforce laws that
prohibit the aggressive cross-aggregation of data that
happens when ILC is exploited. These steps go in the
right direction, but violations may be difficult to detect
and enforce in practice.
The first problem is detecting that a library employs
ILC. The only positive evidence that might be available
is that libraries leak personal data off a device. While
this is a necessary condition for ILC to happen, it is not
sufficient. Moreover, detecting privacy leaks in the first
place is challenging. Static and dynamic analysis tools
are not perfect and may fail to detect all leaks in apps.
Even with perfect detection of leaks, libraries may
have legitimate reasons for sending data off a device, and
so merely observing leakage of sensitive user data does
not imply guilt in exploiting ILC. Thus the major chal-
lenge is born out of the fact that the actual data aggre-
gation during ILC happens on third-party servers. That
is, the actual point of maliciousness happens where it is
not transparent from the outside. Thus, app stores and
regulatory bodies have an uphill battle. One promising
avenue to infer the exploitation of ILC by third-parties is
the use of differential analysis techniques, such as those
employed by Lécuyer et al. [21]
The second problem is that of enforcement. While
apps may be in violation of the terms and conditions
of app stores (or indeed even local and national law),
there is no unifying framework for enforcement across
the app ecosystem. Indeed, there are a number of third-
party app stores that provide apps to millions of users,
which may not necessarily impose the required privacy
policies. Moreover, apps may need to be penalised on a
case by case basis, since they may only be in violation
of a law if the app is downloaded by a user in a partic-
ular country, and there exists proof that specific types
of data on the user have been aggregated. The afore-
mentioned challenges make the large-scale mitigation of
ILC difficult in practice.
7.2 Frequency of Data Leakage
The frequency of data leakage by libraries in apps is a
source of added concern. In Section 6, it was observed
that the average device studied had 2.4 leakages of sen-
sitive data by ad libraries per day. This quantity of
leakages comes from the 7.4 third-party apps used in
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a day, of which 4.7 have more than one million down-
loads. Generalising, approximately 50% of popular apps
installed on devices leak sensitive data from these de-
vices to ad networks.
We would like to remind the reader at this point
that our assumptions with regard to the frequency of
data leakage were very conservative. Indeed, we as-
sumed one sensitive data leak per ad library per app
per day, only if:
1. An app containing an ad library was seen to be run-
ning on a device in a day.
2. An ad library within the running app has the ability
to use one or more permissions and the permissions
declared by the app allowed it to do so.
Many apps are run by users more than once per day.
Moreover, ad libraries also rotate the ads that are shown
while an app is being run, thus adding to the number of
ad requests leaking data. Thus our estimates fail to ac-
count for increased data leakage along two dimensions.
Unfortunately, the data provided by Device Ana-
lyzer, while rich in many regards, does not allow us to
take any more accurate measurements. Moreover, we
only considered apps with more than one million down-
loads. This caused us to ignore approximately 36% of
“unpopular” third-party apps that were run on devices
per day, further reducing our estimate.
For these reasons, we consider our estimates of data
leakage per device per day to be very conservative. How-
ever, even if these conservative numbers represent what
happens in the real-world, it is not reassuring that ad
libraries have the capability to send all the sensitive
data that they have access to from a device more than
twice a day and to almost two different ad networks.
We leave more accurate measurements of the frequency
of data leakages by ad libraries on real-world devices as
an interesting area for future work.
7.3 Limitations of this Study
In this section, the limitations of our methodology are
highlighted and discussed.
7.3.1 Library Permission Usage
Our static analysis approach to determine library per-
mission usage, as detailed in Section 3.2, is limited in its
ability to handle dead code and dynamic code. This is
an inherent limitation of static analysis approaches. If
our system identifies permission usage in dead code, it
will incorrectly attribute it to the library in question and
overstate the library’s permission usage. On the other
hand, since our system fails to handle dynamic code,
it may miss permission usage and thus understate the
library’s permission usage.
Our anecdotal observations, however, suggest that
dead code and dynamic code are not a significant frac-
tion of the code contained within libraries. Moreover,
each type of code has the opposite effect on our esti-
mation of library permission usage. For this reason, we
believe that our estimates generally give a good repre-
sentation of the scale of the problem. We leave handling
dead code and dynamic code as an interesting area for
future work.
7.3.2 Device Analyzer Data
The Device Analyzer client app is more likely to be in-
stalled by a technical set of users, since it is an aca-
demic endeavour and has mostly been promoted indi-
rectly through publications that make use of its data.
For this reason, app lists and app usage information in
Device Analyzer may not fully reflect that of the average
user in the real-world.
However, we suspect that since contributors to De-
vice Analyzer are more technical, our results actually
underestimate the results that would be seen if a more
representative sample of users was used. This is because
we imagine technical users are more savvy and more
likely to take additional steps to preserve their privacy
when choosing apps and using their devices.
8 Related Work
Related work in the area can be divided into several cat-
egories: permission usage increases in apps and libraries,
data collection by libraries, approaches to mitigating
privacy leaks, and sensitive data tracking. In what fol-
lows, we discuss the most closely related work in each
category.
8.1 Permission Usage Increases
Taylor and Martinovic [35] first measured the extent
to which apps were adding permissions over time across
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the Google Play Store. Before that, there was a wide be-
lief that systematic permission increases were happening
but without concrete data. The authors found that apps
on a whole had a tendency to add permissions over time,
and importantly, that embedded libraries were also ben-
efiting from these permissions. They refer to this phe-
nomenon as “library empowerment”. Along similar lines,
we look at the totality of personal data that libraries
would be able to aggregate by leveraging ILC. Addi-
tionally, we use a similar longitudinal study to under-
stand how the potential for libraries exploiting ILC has
changed over time.
Book et al. [7] explore the extent to which Android
ad libraries expanded their permission usage over time.
By looking at app release dates and the ad library ver-
sions that the apps were using, they were able to build a
chronological map of ad library permission usage. They
found increases in permission usage over time as well
as observed that several of the new permissions added
posed risks to user privacy.
When taken together with the aforementioned work
of Taylor and Martinovic, it paints a worrying picture
in that apps are using more permissions, while at the
same time libraries are becoming more able to exploit
these additional permissions to their benefit. Comple-
mentary to this, we measure the extent of what invasive
libraries would be able to gain, were they to exploit their
combined privileges using ILC.
8.2 Data Collection by Libraries
A number of authors looked at the collection and trans-
mission of personal data by libraries. Grace et al. [20]
developed a system called AdRisk, and used it to exam-
ine potential privacy risks posed by ad libraries. They
found that most of the ad libraries studied collected pri-
vate information such as a user’s location. Worryingly,
they found evidence of invasive data collection taking
place such as accessing a user’s call logs. The authors
also found that some ad libraries downloaded and ex-
ecuted code dynamically, leading to security risks on
devices.
Stevens et al. [32] also looked at user privacy in
ad libraries. The authors discovered unsavoury practices
being performed by ad libraries such as the probing of
permissions to see which ones were available to it. The
permissions checked for were beyond the required and
optional permissions specified by the library documen-
tation. This demonstrates the guile of ad libraries in ac-
cessing and trying to access user data. Presumably, the
ad libraries would then access data guarded by permis-
sions that they have access to. The authors confirm their
suspicion by using network traces from a major network
provider to confirm the existence of private data leaked
by the ad libraries in question. Given these observations
that ad libraries will go to extreme (and overt) lengths
for better user profiling, our work aims to understand
what libraries may be doing covertly.
Along similar lines, Book and Wallach [8] consider
the situation where apps themselves pass user data to ad
libraries through internal ad library APIs2. The authors
did a study on 114,000 apps and found that app popu-
larity is correlated with privacy leakage. The authors ar-
gue that the marginal increase in revenue gained, when
taken across millions of users, seems to incentivise the
violation of user privacy. With this motivation from ad
networks in mind, we aim to measure the potentially
more damaging threat of ILC. We also add our voice
to the call for greater privilege separation between apps
and their libraries.
8.3 Privilege Separation
A number of authors propose privilege separation
strategies for apps and their embedded libraries.
Shekhar et al. [30] propose AdSplit, an extension to An-
droid that allows apps and ad libraries to run as separate
processes with separate UIDs. AdSplit is able to auto-
matically separate libraries from their host apps. It does
this by decompiling an app and replacing ad library code
with a “stub library” supporting the same API. This
stub library can then call a separate AdDroid adver-
tisement service. Similar to AdSplit, AFrame achieves
process and permission isolation, but also provides dis-
play and input isolation [41].
Pearce et al. [26] take a different approach to solv-
ing the problem. They build support for advertising di-
rectly into the Android platform with a service called
AdDroid. This eliminates the need for ad networks to
provide ad libraries at all. Instead, AdDroid relays the
transmission of data and handles displaying ads, obvi-
ating the need for an ad library to be resident in app
code.
2 In our manual analysis, we also observed such API calls in ad
libraries. Additionally, ad library SDKs also provided documen-
tation on how app developers should use these APIs. We can
thus confirm the observations of these authors.
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A major drawback of the privilege separation sys-
tems described above is the willingness of ad networks
to adopt them. To counter this, Liu and Simpson [22]
propose privacy-preserving targeted mobile advertising
(PPTMA). Their goal is a system that provides privacy
guarantees to users, while at the same time being palat-
able to ad networks. PPTMA acts as middleware that is
positioned between untrusted ad libraries and sensitive
user data. PPTMA hooks privacy-sensitive APIs and
takes different actions depending on whether an ad net-
work is “cooperative” or whether an app is whitelisted,
and the like.
Seo et al. [29] took a more general approach and
focused on privilege separation between apps and their
libraries as a whole, i.e., their focus was not solely ad
libraries. They devise a system called FlexDroid, which
provides dynamic and fine-grained privilege separation
for third-party libraries. FlexDroid is an extension to
the Android permission system that allows app devel-
opers to specify different sets of permissions for different
libraries. It, however, remains unclear whether app de-
velopers would be interested in limiting permissions to
ad libraries, since it would directly affect their profit
margins.
Similar to FlexDroid, Compac provides fine-grained
access control at the component level [39]. NativeGuard
provides similar protection against libraries written in
native code [33]. Finally, Roesner et al. [27] explore the
secure embedding of interfaces, a technique that would
be useful to support ad libraries.
8.4 Flow and Taint Tracking
Enck et al. [14] took a very early look at how apps used
and transmitted private data using a system they de-
veloped called TaintDroid. Their system is an extension
to the Android platform that allows the tracking of sen-
sitive data flows through apps. Using TaintDroid, the
authors found 68 instances of data leaks across 20 of
the 30 apps that they studied. In a half of the studied
apps, the authors found instances where location data
was sent to several advertisement servers, without user
consent, and even in cases where no ad was displayed.
Arzt et al. [4] propose a system called FlowDroid
that does static taint analysis of Android apps. By accu-
rately modelling the Android life cycle, the authors were
able to obtain high precision in their tests. Along similar
lines, Wei et al. [40] propose Amandroid, a static analy-
sis tool for vetting Android apps. Both FlowDroid and
Amandroid can be used to statically determine whether
data leakage can happen in apps. These tools can assist
in quickly identifying apps that may have concerning
behaviour. Apps seen to be sending sensitive data off
devices may then be further analysed and their libraries
subjected to differential analysis [21] to attempt to iden-
tify the exploitation of ILC.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we highlighted a novel and dangerous
privilege escalation vulnerability called intra-library col-
lusion. ILC is enabled by inherent shortcomings in the
Android permission model whereby privileges between
apps and their embedded libraries are not separated.
If exploited, ILC allows libraries to secretly aggregate
multiple sources of sensitive user data by leveraging the
permissions that they have been granted within two or
more apps. Using app lists from over 30,000 devices, we
observed that several popular social, advertising, and
analytics libraries are able to exploit ILC. Some 57.6%
of the devices studied had at least one library that could
benefit from ILC. These libraries could access a two or
more additional permissions in 30.8% of cases.
By doing a longitudinal study, we observed that sev-
eral libraries increased their ability to exploit ILC. This
happened because the libraries themselves started to use
additional permissions or they became more popular.
The capabilities gained by libraries exploiting ILC were
also seen to increase over time. By doing a case study on
ad libraries, we showed that ad libraries leak sensitive
data from a device up to 2.4 times a day and that the
average user has their personal data sent to 1.7 different
ad servers per day.
As apps and smart devices become more popular,
it is important to ensure that user privacy is protected
from those who attempt to profit from it. By highlight-
ing the novel capability of adversaries in the form of
ILC, we highlight the potential danger, and add our
voice to the call for privilege separation between apps
and their libraries. This work takes us a step further in
securing user privacy as smartphones and smart devices
become ubiquitous and more ingrained in our lives.
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